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Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) has been the source of much controversy in recent months.
On one side, critics of NAFTA argue that the investment protections
in Chapter 11 unduly interfere with legitimate government regulation
and should be pared back. On the other side, defenders of NAFTA
assert that investment protections pose no great threat to national
sovereignty and are necessary to promote economic growth and
development.
Regardless of which side of the debate one is on, it is important
to understand Chapter 11 in its historical context. It came out of a
long and rich tradition of investment treaties and customary
international law which spanned decades, and, in some cases, several
centuries. Throughout this time, governments and dispute settlement
bodies have grappled with precisely the same types of problems that
have become the source of so much controversy today. This is not to
say that the rules cannot be improved, only that the fears that have
been expressed by the more aggressive critics of NAFTA are greatly
exaggerated and, to date, unsupported by the evidence.
* Mr. Price chairs the International Practice at Powell, Goldstein, Frazer &
Murphy LLP in Washington, DC. He has served as counsel in investor-state disputes
and advised governments on investment negotiations. While Deputy General
Counsel in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, he served as a negotiator of
Chapter 11 of NAFTA and numerous bilateral investment treaties. He was also
Deputy Agent of the United States to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in the
Hague. B.A., Haverford College; Diploma in Legal Studies, Cambridge University;
J.D., Harvard Law School (where he was Articles Editor of the Harvard Law
Review). [Editor's Note: This essay is based on the transcript of Mr. Price's remarks
given at the NAFTA Chapter 11 Symposium Conference at Hastings College of the
Law on February 26,2000.]
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Governments and commentators are generally much more
familiar and comfortable with rules regulating international trade
than they are with international investment rules. As a result, while
countries have been successful in negotiating multilateral trade
agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements,
there are no multilateral investment treaties that approach the same
scale and impact.' This is at least in part because trade rules are
generally perceived as rules regulating border measures and are not
perceived as restricting the scope of internal regulations. There are of
course trade rules that do regulate inside the border-most notably
the national treatment rules codified in Article III of the GATrF-but
the perception nevertheless remains.
International investment rules share certain objectives with trade
rules in that both regimes are designed to open markets and liberalize
cross-border transactions. However, there is an important distinction
between the two. Trade rules traditionally have been understood as
regulating trade flows, not traders. Investment rules, in contrast, have
been understood as protecting the enterprise or the investor. This
distinction is reflected, for example, in the national treatment
obligations in trade and investment treaties. GATT Article III, which
sets forth the national treatment rules with respect to trade in goods,
addresses whether a measure has an adverse impact on the conditions
of competition between imported goods and domestically produced
goods. It is not concerned with the impact of a government measure
on the foreign trader or producer itself. A national treatment
obligation in an investment treaty, by contrast, addresses whether the
foreign investor is treated as favorably as the state's own nationals in
like circumstances.
In addition, because foreign investors operate within the border
of a state, they are subject to the full range of regulatory measures
that a state may adopt, not just those affecting trade. All of these
measures could, if not applied or administered properly, adversely
affect such investors. As a result, certain agencies in the U.S.
government have become nervous that international investment rules
1. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, which deals
with performance requirements, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
which deals with, among other things, the provision of services through a
"commercial presence" in a member's territory, both contain provisions that regulate
foreign investment. However, the provisions in these agreements are narrower than
those adopted in NAFTA or in bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
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will curtail their ability to adopt bona fide environmental, health,
safety and other regulations. These concerns are, I believe,
unfounded.
I will address three areas that are particularly controversial: the
guarantee of fair and equitable treatment, the prohibition of
expropriation without compensation, and investor-state dispute
settlement.
H. Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
It is impossible to devise ahead of time a comprehensive list of all
government actions that may adversely and unfairly affect an
investment. As a result, BITs and the NAFTA include several
general protections, including the requirement to ensure fair and
equitable treatment, and have left it to arbitration tribunals to apply
these principles in specific cases. These protections are not designed
to limit legitimate regulatory behavior, but rather to ensure a certain
baseline level of protection that would require governments to act
fairly, in good faith, and transparently in their relations with foreign
investors.
The United States has led the way in advocating the adoption of
the general treatment provisions regulating foreign investments.
However, the substantive investment protections in Chapter 11 of
NAFTA were not written on a blank slate. They evolved over time
and were drawn from a large and growing network of international
investment agreements. These principles are now incorporated into
BITs and other investment agreements of our trading partners and
are accepted by much of the developing world.
The application of investment rules to developed countries, such
as the United States and Canada under NAFTA, has highlighted
more than ever before the complex relationship between such rules
and legitimate regulatory activity. Until now, international
investment rules have generally been fairly easy to apply. When, for
example, Libya or Iran nationalized their oil industries, there was
little debate about whether an expropriation had taken place. Such
wholesale and direct takings of property are less frequent in modern,
industrialized countries and in most of the more advanced developing
countries, such as Mexico, South Korea, and Argentina. Investors in
these countries are often faced with subtle regulatory measures that
may have the same confiscatory effect as outright nationalizations,
even if they are different in form. The most damaging aspects of
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these regimes may fall through the cracks of specific international
investment rules, such as those that address expropriation or
discrimination. This is where the general treatment protections come
into play.
The fair and equitable treatment standard is closely aligned with,
and overlaps, certain fundamental principles of international law-
including transparency, procedural fairness, and the duty of good
faith-from which other, more specific legal rules emanate. It sets a
fairly low bar. If a government measure is a generally applicable,
bona fide, and legitimate exercise of regulatory authority (and there
is no indication that the measure is discriminatory or has an illicit
purpose), the measure will likely survive scrutiny under this standard.
Thus, the general treatment principles will not infringe on the
government's regulatory authority as long as that authority is
exercised in a fair and equitable manner. This is no more than what is
generally expected, and most would agree that this standard should
be met even in the absence of an international investment agreement.
There is no denying the fact that if a law or regulation does not
meet the general treatment standards, then a foreign investor may
challenge that law or regulation. However, the circumstances in
which a violation of the standard would be found are fairly narrow,
which is why there have been only a handful of cases that have
applied the standard. It is probably correct to say that the fair and
equitable treatment protection will be invoked more frequently in the
future as adverse actions take a more subtle or regulatory form.2
There is no reason to expect, however, that arbitration tribunals will
be receptive to attempts to turn the standard into a weapon to attack
bona fide regulatory behavior.
I. Expropriation
Under the expropriation provision, a government may have
undertaken a measure in good faith and in a non-discriminatory
manner, but still be required to pay compensation to an investor
whose property was taken or diminished in value as a result of the
measure. This is not, however, a startling proposition. The same type
of rules exist under the domestic laws of many countries, including
2. Indeed, since the presentation of these remarks at the symposium conference
on February 26, 2000, the NAFTA Panel in Metalclad Corp. v. United States, Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, found that Mexico, acting through one of its municipalities,
violated the fair and equitable treatment standard with respect to a U.S. investor.
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the United States. Governments have adopted these rules because
they recognize that it would be unfair to force an investor to bear the
entire cost of a change in social policy. These costs, at least under
certain circumstances, should be borne by society as a whole.
The question in these cases, of course, is where to draw the line.
It is difficult to determine precisely when the cost of a government
measure that inflicts harm on an identifiable group ought, in fairness,
to be borne by the public as a whole and not by a particular investor.
There are several cases where this issue is particularly difficult. For
example, assume that an investor undertakes an activity that is
approved by society and determined to be beneficial. However, on
the basis of new scientific evidence, the government subsequently
determines that the behavior is harmful and should be prohibited. It
must be decided in this case whether the government should be
permitted simply to put the investor out of business without paying
compensation-an act which would adversely affect not only the
investor but also the employees of the enterprise and possibly the
local economy. Alternatively, a tribunal may decide-correctly in the
vast majority of cases-that the government must compensate the
investor and so spread the cost of the regulatory measure.
Simply designating a government measure as a conservation
measure, or a health and safety measure, does not answer the basic
question about who should bear its costs, and should not be enough
to remove that measure from international investment disciplines.
The purpose of the regulation may be very noble, but it is necessary
to examine how that purpose is effectuated and the impact on the
affected investor. Indeed, the standard formulation of the
expropriation norm assumes that the measure in question is
nondiscriminatory and for a public purpose. The duty to compensate
is imposed as the final requirement ensuring the legality of
expropriation.
While I believe that the expropriation provision and other
provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11, such as the fair and equitable
treatment provision, can accommodate a number of the concerns that
have been expressed by the opponents of investment rules, I also
recognize that, as a political matter, some may wish additional
substantive safeguards built into the system. One possible solution
would be to allow every country one or two "irrational" (from the
point of view of others) choices when and if a new attempt is made to
negotiate multilateral investment rules. For example, Canada may
want to create a reservation for certain cultural matters, while France
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may wish to carve out certain exceptions for agriculture.
Governments could be given some latitude to take reservations in the
areas that they deem to be most sensitive in addition to those
exceptions normally found in investment treaties. However, such
reservations ought to be explicit, not buried in a vague exception to a
rule, and they should be limited to a negotiated level of economic
impact. That is, a treaty party's "irrational" choices should not
adversely affect more than an agreed (and limited) percentage of
another party's trade or investment.
This approach is far preferable to building sweeping limitations
into the basic investment rules. Refining the definition of
expropriation to carve out of its scope, e.g., "all generally applicable,
bona fide regulations, adopted and applied in a nondiscriminatory
fashion, which otherwise constitute a legitimate exercise of traditional
police powers," would be oppressive and cumbersome and would
inevitably swallow the protection that the expropriation rule was
designed to provide.
IV. Dispute Settlement
The dispute settlement provisions in Chapter 11 and BITs are
among the most controversial because, unlike the WTO dispute
resolution procedures, they (1) expose host states to challenges
brought by private investors, and (2) afford damages for past conduct
instead of only prospective relief.
Early investment treaties preserved the idea that disputes over
international investment obligations were matters to be resolved only
by states. Thus, historically, investors were protected by the cloak of
the crown's authority. Any injury to the investor or its property, if
unremedied by the domestic courts of the host government, was
considered an injury to the foreign investor's crown. Under the
doctrine of espousal, the foreign crown could take action to remedy
such injury. If a host government injured a foreign national and
failed to compensate him, then the foreign sovereign could bring a
claim against the state responsible for the injury. If there were no
forum in which to bring a claim, then the foreign sovereign could
unilaterally determine that a breach of international law had occurred
and could take measures against the injuring state.
The first widespread international investment agreements-
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaties and Treaties
of Amity-embody more clearly than does NAFTA this residual
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notion of investor rights stemming from, and enforced by, the
investor's sovereign. Some FCNs set up a regime whereby investors
could submit disputes to special courts. In most cases, however, only
a government party could challenge a breach of the FCN treaty by the
other government party.
The rise of BITs changed the regime for investor protection and
introduced the concept of investor-state dispute settlement. The idea
behind this change was to depoliticize investment disputes by taking
them out of a state-to-state forum and empowering investors to seek
redress in their own right. By allowing the investor to litigate its
claim directly, the investor's sovereign could distance itself from the
dispute. Investors also welcomed this development because it gave
them the opportunity to seek redress without being held hostage to
their own government's political will or whim. The investor's claim
would be decided on the merits and would not be subsumed within a
larger political or foreign relations dialogue between its government
and the host government.
The predecessor to NAFTA, the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), did not incorporate investor-state
dispute settlement, nor did it incorporate a number of essential
provisions, starting with the definition of investment. In the
CUSFTA, investment was defined much more narrowly and
restricted to controlling interests in an enterprise. It was not the
broad asset- and enterprise-based definition you see in NAFTA.
Chapter 11 of NAFTA significantly improved the investment
protections in the CUSFTA and adopted wholesale most of the
investment protections that had been developed through BITs,
including the dispute settlement mechanism.
While some governments and interest groups have expressed
alarm over the dispute settlement procedures in NAFTA and BITs,
there is little or no evidence to show that these procedures have been
abused or used to subject governments to harsh or unwarranted
punishment. To a large extent, trust in international investment rules
will require trust in the dispute settlement tribunals that are tasked
with applying those rules. Arbitration tribunals are judicial bodies
governed by the rule of law. If they function correctly, they will
understand the purpose and intent of the investment rules in NAFTA
and BITs and will not permit the process to be abused by arbitrarily
striking down legitimate regulations.
It is, of course, possible that frivolous claims will be brought. But
frivolous claims are brought every day in our national judicial
2000]
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systems, and they do not threaten our democracy or our sovereignty.
Dispute resolution tribunals may also make incorrect or erroneous
decisions from time to time. However, neither our polity nor our
judicial system is so frail that it cannot withstand the odd erroneous
decision.
Whenever a country enters into an international agreement, it
restricts its sovereignty in some measure. In fact, the very purpose of
international agreements is to require or prohibit government action.
To claim that any such restraint is impermissible or unwise is to call
into question the entire international legal order. Furthermore, if
international agreements are to have any practical meaning, then they
must include a mechanism for holding governments accountable for
their actions. This is what the dispute settlement mechanism in BITs
and in NAFTA seeks to achieve, and this is neither new nor
threatening.
V. Conclusion
Allowing recourse to, and accepting decisions of, international
dispute settlement bodies underpins the international economic
order. The United States benefits significantly from broad-based
recognition of the legitimacy of international arbitration awards and
decisions of the WTO dispute panels and of the International Court
of Justice. For these reasons, it would be wise to continue on the
course that we have followed to date and preserve the integrity of the
dispute settlement system.
If the United States backed away from its commitment to
international investment rules, it would reverse fifty years of U.S.
leadership in the progressive development of international
investment protection and raise serious questions about our
commitment to fundamental principles of international law.
Moreover, the United States has traditionally been not only the
champion but also the beneficiary of international investment rules.
The United States has itself frequently invoked dispute settlement
provisions to break down trade barriers or redress injuries to
investors. Indeed, of the approximately thirty claims under BITs that
have come before the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), about one-third have been brought by
U.S. investors. In addition, five NAFTA claims have been brought by
U.S. investors.
Eliminating or weakening key investment protections would,
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furthermore, harm the competitiveness of U.S. companies abroad and
significantly reduce the protections that the United States has worked
so hard to achieve. The harm to U.S. investors would be acutely felt
in the coming years as developing countries move away from highly-
regulated, centralized economies to market-oriented, free enterprise
systems. Hundreds of new privatization initiatives and other
economic opportunities arise each year. Without the full range of
protections codified in current investment treaties, U.S. investors may
lose significant investment opportunities to foreign competitors
shielded by stronger, more comprehensive, treaties.
It would be ironic and regrettable if the United States, which has
been the chief proponent for subjecting sovereign actions to scrutiny
under international law, were now to lead the retreat from the
international principles it worked so hard to enshrine.

